This paper provides a detailed critical analysis of the case of Coman, where the Court of Justice clarified that the meaning of the term 'spouse' in Directive 2004/38 was gender-neutral, opening up the door for same-sex marriage recognition for immigration purposes all around the EU, thus destroying the heteronormative misinterpretations of the clear language of the Directive practiced in a handful of Member States. The state of EU law after Coman is still far from perfect, however: we underline a line of important questions which remain open and which the Court will need to turn to in the near future to ensure that marriage equality in moves beyond mere proclamations in the whole territory of the Union.
Introduction
The case of Coman, 1 decided on 5 June 2018, is akin to a lemma proven: totally unsurprising in terms of result, yet an achievement in terms of elegance and depth, leading to the further development of equality and non-discrimination law in Europe. The Grand Chamber clarified that the gender-neutral framing of 'spouse' in Article 2(2)(a) of the Citizenship Directive 2004/38 implies that, yes, indeed, married same-sex couples enjoy free movement rights equally to heterosexual married couples throughout the whole territory of the Union, no matter how each particular Member State frames 'family' in its own legislation. This now includes situations where a gay union remains unrecognized in violation of ECHR law, as Article 8 ECHR contains a positive obligation to this effect, 2 which is of sufficiently general nature, 3 while differences based solely on sexual orientation are outlawed. 4 This was exactly the case in Romania, where a Romanian-American, Mr Coman, wished to move in together with his American husband, Mr Hamilton. Discrimination on this ground is thus not any more inherent in the fabric of the internal market 5a development as long awaited, 6 as it is absolutely welcome, finally putting a thick full stop in a long esoteric debate concerning who should be entitled to define 'spouse' and what the term should mean. 7 1 Case C-673/16, Coman et al. v . Inspectoratul General pentru Imigrări, ECLI:EU:C:2018:385. 2 In ECtHR, Oliari et al. v. Italy, Appl. nos. 18766/11 and 36030/11, judgment of 21 July 2015, the ECtHR found Italy to be in breach of Art. 8 ECHR for the failure to institute 'a specific legal framework providing for the recognition and protection of … same-sex unions' (para. 185). Cf. Ragone and Volpe, "An Emerging Right to a "Gay" Family Life? The Case Oliari v. Italy in a Comparative Perspective", (2016), 17 GLJ 451. Even more: ECtHR held in Pajić v. Croatia Appl. No. 68453/13, judgment of 23 February 2016, that a same-sex partnership implies a possibility of family reunification (paras. [74] [75] [76] [77] 85) . In other words, if only Romania was a state compliant with ECHR lawan impossibility, of courseno recourse to EU law would be necessary at all in this case. 3 There is a debate on the scope of the obligation contained in Oliari. In any event, the legal conditions of the Member States of the EU appear to be sufficiently similar to expect Romania to be bound by the obligation directed in Oliari to Italy. This is particularly so following Orlandi and Others v. Italy, Apps. Nos 26432/12. 26742/12, 44057/12 and 60088/12, judgment of 14 Dec. 2017, where the ECtHR required to introduce some form of recognition of same-sex marriages celebrated abroad. But see, Tryfonidou This working paper will first present the facts and the law involved, as well as the turbulent context of a referendum, held in the Romania on 6 and 7 October 2018, to entrench the heteronormativity of the families recognized by law into the national constitution, akin to the ones in Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Slovakia. We will then set out, very briefly, the key lines of argument in Advocate General Wathelet's Opinion, and summarize the decision of the Court.
Having situated the Grand Chamber's ruling in context, and explained the core achievements of the case, we will move to the analysis of the numerous outstanding problems the case failed to tackle. 5 June 2018 is bound to remain a notable date on the calendar of achieving marriage equality, yet, crucially, our analysis will demonstrate that the EU is just at the beginning of a long road and plentiful crucial issues remained unresolved. The federalization of equality rights in the EU is a vitally important on-going development 8 to which Coman has greatly contributed: EU sexual citizenship has just received a pivotal boost. 9 Although the constitution of Romania, unlike the constitutional texts of Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Slovakia, contains a gender-neutral phrasing surrounding 'family', the Romanian Civil Code (Codul Civil) not only defines marriage as the union of a man and a woman, 16 but also stipulatesin a rather atypical manner for continental civil codes -that "marriage between persons of the same sex shall be prohibited" and, even more specifically, "marriages between persons of the same sex entered into or contracted abroad by Romanian citizens or by foreigners shall not be recognized in Romania". 17 Far from being dead-letter, the formulation contained in Codul Civil in fact affected the meaning that the Constitutional Court of Romania has given to the gender neutral provision of the constitution. In other words, the case of Coman arouse in a very hostile legal context.
Factual and legal background in the context of Romanian developments
Politically, poisonous turmoil of Romanian public life marked by countless scandals, mass protests and corruption, 18 also unquestionably boasts an on-going homophobic line to it. The centre-stage here is occupied by the Romanian 'Campaign for Family' NGO Coalition, which collected 3.000.000 signatures in the span of six months in 2016 in order to hold a national referendum to amend the Constitution of the country. This initiative replaced a gender-neutral definition of marriage with a restrictive one, presenting marriage as a union between a man and a woman. This is an astonishingly large number of signatures for a country of less than 20 million inhabitants; just half a million signatures create a legal obligation to initiate the process. Even more strikingly, the Romanian Constitutional Court did not see any problem with the substance of the proposed amendment, alleging in fact that it was unnecessary given that, although gender-neutral, the relevant provision of the Constitution (Article 48(1)) already implied the prohibition of same-sex marriage, as Constantin Cojocariu reported. 19 The referendum, held in October 2018, failed due to low turnoutonly 20% of the voters, instead of at least 30% required, showed up to vote. The story of the referendum demonstrates quite clearly that the country essentially has not moved far away from its pre-accession stance, where parliamentarians worried that the membership of the EU could actually undermine the situation of steep discrimination against sexual minorities and when the Romanian Orthodox Church campaigned incessantly against the decriminalization of homosexuality. 20 When explained that EU law honours basic principles of dignity, equality and non-discrimination the members of the Romanian parliament expressed worries and confusion: entering the EU was not supposed to mean 'entering Sodom and Gomorrah'. 21 Coman, therefore, will no doubt renew the fears in these circles.
Opinion of the Advocate General
On 11 January 2018, Advocate General Melchior Wathelet delivered his Opinion, which was largely based on exploring two possible paradigms of interpreting the available secondary law of the Union in this case. According to the applicants, the Dutch Government, and the Commission, Article 2(2)(a) of Directive 2004/38 must be given a uniform autonomous interpretation. According to that interpretation, the national of a third country of the same sex as the Union citizen to whom he or she is lawfully married in accordance with the law of a Member state is covered by the term "spouse". In contrast, the Romanian, Latvian, Hungarian and Polish governments contended that the term "spouse" does not fall within the scope of EU law, but must be defined in the light of the law of the host Member State. 22 The AG opted for the first approach, considering that the autonomous interpretation must be applied and that the meaning of the term "spouse" used in Article 2(2)(a) of Directive 2004/38 must be independent of the sex of the person who is married to a Union citizen. 23 The AG further looked into the argument advanced by the Latvian government regarding the justification by "national identity" on behalf of Romania regarding the supposedly sensitive status of marriage. To this the learned AG answered that, if the concept of marriage were to be considered related to national identity in certain Member States, the obligation to respect that identity, which is set out in Article 4(2) TEU, cannot be construed independently of the obligation of sincere cooperation set out in Article 4(3) TEU. 24 The AG further explored the drafting history of Directive 2004/38 and concluded that the chosen word ("spouse") was deliberately neutral. 25 Although the expression "spouse" had previously been used by the Commission in its initial proposal, the Parliament wished to mention the irrelevance of the sex of the person concerned, by adding the words "irrespective of sex, according to the relevant national legislation". However, the Council expressed its reluctance to opt for a definition of the term "spouse" that would expressly include spouses of the same sex. At the time, only two Member states had adopted legislation authorizing marriage between person of the same sex, and the Court had previously held that the definition of marriage generally accepted by the Member states at the time referred to a union between two persons of opposite sex. Relying on the Council's concerns, the Commission preferred to "restrict [its] proposal to the concept of spouse as meaning in principle spouse of a different sex, unless 19 Cojocariu, "Same-Sex Marriage before the Courts and before the People: The Story of a Tumultuous Year for LGBT Rights in Romania", Verfassungsblog (25 January 2017), available at: https://verfassungsblog.de/same-sex-marriage-before-thecourts-and-before-the-people-the-story-of-a-tumultuous-year-for-lgbt-rights-in-romania/. 20 Turcescu and Stan, "Religion, Politics and Sexuality in Romania", 57 Europe-Asia Studies (2005), 291. 21 Ibid., 294. 22 Para 31 of the AG Opinion. 23 Para. 32 of the AG Opinion. 24 Para. 40 of the AG Opinion. 25 Para. 51 of the AG Opinion.
there are subsequent developments". 26 The AG therefore concluded that no argument in favour of one interpretation over the other could be derived from the drafting history of the Directive, 27 and that the wording of the term "spouse" in the Directive was neutral based on the context and the objective of the Directive. 28 The AG further affirmed that EU law must be interpreted "in the light of the present day circumstances", 29 and, based on statistical and comparative analysis from various jurisdictions regarding the scope of fundamental rights, 30 concluded that the broad interpretation of the term 'spouse' provides the optimum respect for family life guaranteed in Article 7 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, while leaving to Member States the freedom to authorizeor nota marriage between persons of the same sex. 31 Likewise, the AG concluded that the objective pursued by the Directive 2004/38 supports a broad autonomous interpretation of the term 'spouse', independent of sexual orientation 32 The AG has also suggested a plan B to the Court, in case it would not follow his suggested reasoning about the interpretation of 'spouse'. If Mr Coman's husband was not a 'spouse' due to Romanian law, he had to be considered a partner or other family member under Article 3 of the Directive. The Opinion argued that due to the marital bond recognized by another Member State, there would be no discretion to refuse admission in this case. 33
Judgment of the Court of Justice
In its preliminary observations, the Court presented its major finding; that if during the genuine residence of a Union citizen in a Member State other than that of which (s)he is a national, family life is created or strengthened, TFEU requires that the citizen's family life may continue when (s)he returns to the Member State of origin. 34 Although the Directive, which aims to regulate the rights of EU citizens outside of their Member State of nationality, would not apply to such cases directly, Article 21(2) TFEU is unquestionably applicable by analogy. 35 If no such derived right of residence were granted, the Union citizen would be discouraged from exercising rights under EU law. The Court, therefore, logically based the questions referred by the national court on the premise that, during the period of his genuine residence in Belgium, Mr Coman created or strengthened a family life with Mr Hamilton. 36 The Court then continued with an unequivocal interpretation that the term 'spouse' within the meaning of Directive 2004/38 was gender-neutral. It could therefore cover the same-sex spouse of the Union citizens concerned. 37 It followed that a Member State cannot rely on its national law as justification for refusing to recognize in its territory a marriage concluded by that national with a Union citizen of the same sex in another Member State, in accordance with the law of that state, for the sole purpose of granting a derived right of residence to a third-country national. 38 Admittedly, a person's status, which is relevant to the rules on marriage, remains a matter that falls within the competence of the Member States, and 26 Para. 51 of the AG Opinion. 27 Para. 52 of the AG Opinion. 28 Para. 53 of the AG Opinion. 29 it is legally unknown, in order to ensure that free movement can be enjoyed without discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation all across the territory of the Union. Particularly important in this regard is the outright dismissal of the esoteric defense of moral choices to discriminate without any critical scrutiny, clothed by the terminology of "constitutional identity", 50 which has played its ambiguous role in the line of case law regarding the right to a name. 51 It is thus a most welcome and atypical development, given prior case law, that the ECJ does not use identity excuses in order to humiliate minorities when sexual minorities are involved. 52 The absurdity of the 'protection of the traditional family' argument, which lies at the core of 'identity' considerations, was outlined by AG Wathelet, as well as previously by AG Jääskinen in his Opinion in Römer, 53 and, given its obvious clarity, diverging from it would be difficult for the Court.
Hence, indeed, there are no surprises. The outcome and reasoning of Coman has been awaited in the literature for years, and has been discussed at countless conferences, including the meetings uniting renowned authorities in the field of EU law, such as London-Leiden seminars. 54 All types of interpretations of the Directive in question; its drafting history; 55 as well as parallels with other fields where mutual recognition is similarly required in the context of the lack of EU's legislative competence, in particular the recognition of names; 56 with all the rich case-law at hand, all warrant a conclusion that Coman is among the best-founded decisions of the Court in its history from the viewpoints of legal certainty and the articulation of the letter and the spirit of the law.
The outcome was mandated by the language of the relevant legal provisions since their inception, and could thus only seem problematic in the context of EU law, where the key principle, to agree with Somek, is the lack of clarity. 57 Most surprisingly, however, until Coman, the ECJ has not had a chance to demand either absolute mutual recognition of same-sex couples moving between Member States, nor to clarify the meaning of a term 'spouse' under Directive 2004/38/ECthe two options that have been evidently open for changing the current practice of national-level non-compliance in a number of Member States. The EU free movement of persons regime has thus tolerated discrimination on the basis of sex and sexual orientation as its starting point, a regrettable situation long described in the literature in detail. 61 The early case of P. v. S (1996), 62 where the ECJ used a gender equality clause to protect the rights of transsexuals, was already a huge achievement for LGBT rights, considering that back in the 1950s, when the European Economic Community was established, judges all over Europe (including the Council of Europe's European Commission for Human Rights) employed the language of crime, pathology and deviation when describing any alternative sexuality or gender identity. 63 Indeed, the WHO removed homosexuality from its list of diseases only in 1992. 64 P. v. S. was of little help to lesbian and gay couples, however, as the ECJ refused to apply its sexual discrimination approach to such relationships. 65 This produced a truly shaky, if not outright shameful, jurisprudence that has now been laid to rest, 66 though not explicitly overruled (the question 'why not' remains). In the EU of Grant v. SWT, gay couples remained entirely unprotected, the calls to the contrary from the European Parliament notwithstanding. 67 The introduction of sexual orientation as a ground of discrimination via Article 19 TFEU, and subsequent harmonization of this equality field "beyond gender" by 2000 Equality Directives, has 59 An explicit statement of the gender-neutral essence of the term is unequivocally stated in para. 35. changed the situation slightly, but has not solved the core outstanding problems. 68 The Court's post-2000 jurisprudence has largely failed to make any real break-throughs regarding recognition of the equal status for same-sex unions, some achievements notwithstanding: 69 
Problems and open questions
It would be unwise to present Coman in a solely celebratory light. The case poses a number of important questions, which will only be answered in case law and practice in the years to come. Let us have a look at the most important features of the case likely to have lasting significance through either remaining problematic, or by providing further food for thought for lawyers and policy-makers.
Questions about the Commission's effectiveness and the failure of conditionality
The case of Coman allows one to ask where the Commission, the 'guardian of the Treaties', was in a situation where, for more than ten years, 72 TEU. 75 Although the general ability of the EU institutions to enforce these values has been far from obvious to commentators as of late, 76 the Commission could in fact do much more than bringing Article 258 TFEU cases against the Romanias of our Union. Unlike in cases of rule of law or democracy backslidingsuch as Hungary and Poland 77 the values at play in the context of same-sex families are not at the fringes of the acquis, but in the text of the Directive itself, which instantly removes plenty of problems faced by the institution in other value-spheres. 78 While nothing has been doneand in this we emphasize the shame of the Commission for not actingthe embarrassment was particularly reinforced by the silence from the Commission on this issue in its regular reports on EU citizenship. Article 258 TFEU is clearly open to the Commission now that Coman has restated the obvious. Given that Romania is not the only state acting in this homophobic fashion, and the fact that 'spouse' in the Directive is gender-neutral, it is up to the Commission to ensure that Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Slovakia, whatever their constitutions are said to mandate, all honour same-sex marriages for the purposes of free movement. Even more: all the Member States not providing for same-sex marriage, such as Italy or Slovenia, will have to ensure, in practice and on paper, that the unconditional nature of the admission of same-sex spouses in the situations falling within the scope of application of Directive 2004/38 and of Coman's Singh-inspired scope, can fully benefit from the automatic nature of spousal admission in Article 2(2)(a) of the Directive, without any illegal attempts to treat spouses as 'registered partners'. It is now clear that any attempt to do that would be a wrongful implementation of the Directive 2004/38.
An even more acute question arises, however, out of the Commission's inaction. The Member States recently admitted to the Union and known to be problematic in the context of gender equality face overwhelming scrutiny from the Commission under the Council's mandate to implement the conditionality principle. 79 Sneaking the twin equality directives of 2000 through the legislative process allowed the Union to move on from the humiliation of Grant. Even so, the Commission admitted states expected to oppose same-sex marriage and the improvement of the rights situation of the LGBT community in the context of a broader 'Failure of Conditionality' exercise, 80 where anti-gay legislation and practice has not in fact deterred their membership, 81 including in particular the case of Romania. 82 They have also been free to continue that which had to be solved before they became Member States post-accession. in such contentious fields, particular caution is required. 92 It is thus possible to agree with Alina Tryfonidou, that "in EU Member States, full marriage equality is unlikely to be imposed from above". 93
Questions about the sustainability of a single-purpose recognition

Questions about the acceptability of the free movement paradigm for non-discrimination
Single-purpose recognition is not the whole story. The case of Coman reinforces a very particular view of EU law. The free-movement paradigm has little to offer to those who would expect their dignity and family life protected without pleasing the 'apolitical' rationale of the internal market: 94 those who stay at home, 95 those who would be 'illegal' in a host Member Statefor example, Miss Dano, in love with another Roma lady 96 and many others. The Coman victory is thus cum grano salis: it is too selfconsciously aware of its federal limitations in terms of competence. 97 The Court was too afraid to tread on the long Polish tradition of discriminatory family ideals and Latvia's arguments of 'constitutional identity', implying that 'identity' consists in ensuring that, in a Union where sex and sexual-orientation discrimination are illegal, 98 and tolerance is one of the values of Article 2 TEU, these goals are never reached, and gay families remain persecuted. This is, to agree with Massimo Fichera, one of the core problems with free movement law as such. "It seems to be built on what is considered 'normal,' so that deviations from normalcy are not contemplated". 99 At the same time, the justification behind the choice of the key paradigm of 'normal' to be protected are blurry and not always clear, to say the least. This has the effect of punishing those persons and relationships that do not fall within the proclaimed 'good citizenship' ideal, 100 be it a same-sex family, a person with a disability, 101 or a woman absent from work during pregnancy. 102 Coman represents enormous progress compared with Grant v. SWT just twenty years ago, warranting one of the authors of this note to correct his earlier statement calling the Grant Court a "homophobic bench". 103 It is still far-removed from the basic Karstean dignity-oriented approach 104 demonstrated by other jurisdictions around the world. It is thus not marriage equality, it is the boosting of the internal market ideology, rightly described by Weiler as standing 'naked, without a mantle of ideals', 105 that the case of Coman has advanced.
Consequently, the gay community faces a situation where, though the dignity of fundamental human bonds is unquestionably recognized, loving each other is only possible in the Union today if one avails themselves of at least some protections of the law, particularly when the context is 'cross-border' and market friendly. 'Bad citizens' of the EU, unlike the 'good citizens', fail to understand and live by the ideal of the internal market and cross-border movement, and as such do not enjoy the most basic dignity under EU law. Family life for gay EU citizens is still light years away from being fully recognized and solidified as a true enforceable right at the level of EU law. It is not mentioned in Part II TFEU and thus, apparently, is not part of 'other rights in the Treaties', which Article 20 TFEU refers to, pace Article 9 CFR, 106
Questions about coherence across different instruments of secondary law
Coman has implications for the understanding of the meaning of 'spouse' in the context of other secondary EU law, especially the Family Reunification Directive. 107 Although today's practice in some Member States, as Titshaw reports, 108 treats same-sex couples under different directives differently, such practice unquestionably falls short of the idea of uniform application of EU law. This implies that the semantic unity of the key notions it operates with, as well the compliance with ECHR law, as nondiscrimination, family, and private life in the ECHR, are not citizenship-specific and bind the statesparties equally in their regulation of the family life of own and EU citizens, as well as foreigners.
The question of 'genuine residence'
That 'genuine residence' is required is of course a problem, since the direct consequence of someone's residence being deemed 'genuine' is the ability to go on effectively enjoying family life and dignity. In the context where the meaning of 'residence' in the law does not overlap neatly with physical presence, a 'genuine residence' under the law of several Member States is nothing else but the possession of a legally-acquired residence title. It seems to be highly problematic to demand more, especially where someone's family life is dependent on this. To put it differently, this allows for 'abuse of law'. 109 The Commission, as we have discussed above, does not do enough to promote gay rights and nondiscrimination against same-sex families. At the same time, for some couples, establishing residence elsewhere is the only way to gain dignity and basic legal recognition for one's same-sex family under the law of a Member State. For Coman to include a criterion judging how 'genuine' someone's residence is amounts to one thing: supplying homophobic states with an additional argument to avoid complying with the law, so that they may continue discriminating against sexual minorities. Such an approach invites a whole range of problematic questions and seems to be anything but sustainable.
Questions about the utility of private international law approaches
Speaking of a 'marriage lawfully concluded in the host Member State', Coman does not answer crucial questions about the very possibility of the celebration of a same-sex marriage in contemporary EU law. The ECJ has now officially endorsed setting aside private law rules in Coman situations, 110 but they could offer an impenetrable obstacle to the establishment of a marriage in law. This is another issue in line to be tackled in order to make Coman fully effective. This is due to the fact that precisely because of discrimination in the law of the Member State of nationality, making same-sex marriages impossible, the celebration of such a marriage in a different Member State could also be hindered, as Ulli Jessurun d'Oliveira has wonderfully explained. 111 For example, in cases where a same-sex marriage is being celebrated, Belgian law allows departure from the requirement of compliance with the national law of the state of nationality of the partners prohibiting same-sex marriage, if the law of the state of nationality or habitual residence of one of the partners allows for same-sex marriage. 112 
Questions about the dangers of 'strengthening family life' formulae
There is a real problem with the 'created or strengthened' family life language the Court employs. 115 Families go through phases. In Shortbus, the main character is a married woman who discovers she craves a bisexual threesome relationship, and whose first orgasm coincides with the great blackout of New York City. One does not need to see this movie to realize that family life can linger on the backburner, freeze, or, sometimes, be reborn again. A cold family on the ruins of a love that died is still a family, however, as much as an open relationship involving more than two. Likewise, a long-distance union of hearts, where partners never see each other but could nevertheless be dearly present in each other's lives, are families all the same. 'Strengthening' language opens a Pandora's box of a potentially disastrous ECJ intervention into what should be the partners' realm only. Free movement should apply to families getting ready to divorce, to those who hate each other, and to those families in which one of the partners is preparing to die. What is going on between the partners is not and cannot possibly be the ECJ's business. Moreover, this has been the classic approach in the case law all along, recalling the facts of Singh, in which a UK/third-national couple moved back to the UK to divorce and was exempted from immigration controls via the application of EU law. Considering the astonishing variety of human bonds and interactions falling under the umbrella term of 'family', the last thing we want is the Court unable to utter the word 'sex' to tell us what 'strengthening' is. 116 Consider how the Court has reduced human agency in other fields, such as 'integration' into the society of the host state, 117 'work', 118 or 'sufficient resources', 119 bringing disaster to a great number of families and giving EU free-movement law an awkward illiberal turn. This hits both workers and other citizens hard, 120 and makes the Court a true 'actor of injustice' 121 in the eyes of some. The sacrifices made in achieving levels of protection for the ordinary men and women all around the EU teach a simple lesson. Whatever the reasons for the Court to take steps backand either they fail to convince the addressees, thereby ensuring that the sacrifices of rights made are probably not entirely in vain 122 it is better for the Court to stay out of our lives and our of our beds. Coman regrettably fails this 'no harm done' test by venturing into the 'strengthening' enigmas not mandated by either secondary or primary law. 125 citing legal instruments and case-law in support of this statement, which used to bash same-sex partners still ten years ago. Such statements are entirely empty and counterproductive, if no arguments are given in their support besides 'while loving your same-sex partnersomething that was untenable and immoral before -is ok, don't you dare loving two people!' What we are witnessing is the culture of justification in action: 126 the beating heart of modern constitutionalism. Once good arguments are not available to defend the limiting involvement of the authority, the rule should go. It is thus very difficult to disagree with Nora Markard's excellent analysis: "in the cases of both polygamy and incest, as with same-sex marriage, moral disapproval -the 'yuck factor'has to yield in the face of autonomy and privacy; only rational reasons can sustain a prohibition of marriage". 127 The EU has played a crucial role in the process of bringing down absurd rules continentwide. This process, should one believe Gareth Davies, often amounted to the humiliation of states by confronting them with the utterly, inexplicably stupid choices they make. 128 Coman is a great example of that. Yet, the pressure will obviously be mounting to explain to a married woman why she cannot also marry her long-term female lover. The absurdity of pretending that long-standing multi-partner relationships are not a day-to-day practice is self-evident, yet, the law is frequently not on the social reality side. Precisely as the Romanian Civil Code, which will not be applied in Coman.
Questions about non-binary unions and the future of public policy in this field
There is a curious fact one has to raise in the context of polygamy. The EU is a jurisdiction where registered partnerships and marriages de jure tend to be worlds apart, and where some marriages are not universally recognized as marriages. Consequentially, following the outcome of Coman, EU law obviously makes polygamy legally possible throughout the Member States. Having married Thijs in Brussels, Leszek can return to native Poland, where this marriage will not be recognized and thus form no legal impediment for him to marry Volha in Natolin. As underlined by David de Groot, this is a most ironic outcome of trying to uphold one crucial rule about marriage throughout the EU: total intolerance of polygamy. 129 Be it as it may, this is a great development, as long as Leszek is happy (just as is Thijs and as is Volha, should they be informed about it).
Federal rainbow dream: comparative outlook
AG Wathelet mentions a broad comparative paradigm for Coman, specifying that jurisdictions as diverse as Canada, New Zealand, South Africa, Argentina, USA and Taiwan have all opened the gate for same-sex marriages. 130 In the EU itself, apart from thirteen Member States which have legalized homosexual marriage, nine other Member States have a registered partnership open to couples of the same sex (Slovenia, Czechia, Hungary, Austria, Croatia, Estonia, Cyprus, Greece and Italy). Emerging global consensus on the issue is absolutely clear. 131 Hence, the days when constitutional lawyers would say that only a small number of EU countries recognizes same-sex unions are entirely passé. This is even more the case given that not offering a registered partnership (at least) in the national law is now a violation of the ECHR. 132 There is a clear consensus that cannot be overlooked by the Court of Justice regarding a nascent recognition of same-sex unions in the absolute majority of EU Member States these days. Yet American jurisprudence and the liberalization from the European Court of Human Rights remain undoubtedly the major inspirations for advancing the federal track on litigating same-sex marriages in Coman via EU law.
A somewhat schizophrenic judgement of the US Supreme Court came in the case of Masterpiece Cake Shop, which preceded the judgement in Coman just by one day. The case regarded the religious sensibilities of a Colorado baker, who refused to deliver a cake for a gay wedding. Another judgment of the US Supreme court, Obergefell v. Hodges (2015). 133 stands as a crucial example of a federal opportunity for gays and lesbiansa legal track that has been explored by lawyers with regard to Coman. Although Obergefell was widely streamlined in the media as the judgement about same-sex marriages, de jure the decision is more about recognition of rights derived from marriage than status, which ironically made the recognition of status all over the American states only a question of time. The case was launched after a same-sex couple, James Obergefell and John Arthur, married in Maryland. Their state of residence -Ohiodid not recognize their marriage license, and they went to court. John Arthur was terminally ill and suffering from amyotrophic lateral sclerosis. For this reason, they wanted the other partner, James Obergefell, to be identified as his surviving spouse on his death certificate, based on their marriage in Maryland. Through this paradigm of rights based on free movement between the states, the Supreme Court established that a there is a fundamental right to marry guaranteed to samesex couples by the Due Process clause and the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States constitution.
The European Court of Human Rights quickly followed with the Oliari & Others v. Italy (2015) judgement, 134 where the Court suddenly established that Italy should offer some form of registered partnership or marriage to gay couples. How far-reaching the distinction between the two can be is limited by ECHR law and expressly includes family reunification, following Pajić. It is remarkable that in Oliari, the ECtHR refers to comparative jurisprudence, giving the example of the decision in the US Supreme court that preceded Strasbourg by just a couple of weeks. 135 This Strasbourg judgement also captures the growing consensus in the Member States of the Council of Europe, noting that 11 countries of the Council of Europe recognized same-sex marriages, while 18 offered recognition of various forms of same-sex partnerships at the moment of the decision. 136 Of course in Coman, the ECJ rounded this important circle of federal thinking, adding to a tacit-recognition track for same sex marriages visible in the jurisprudence of the US Supreme Court and the European Court of Human Rights. Coman allows asking uncomfortable questions about the state of the rule of law in Romania and the ability of that country to offer effective protection of rights to its citizens, thus fully benefiting from the membership of the Council of Europe and the European Union.
